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JOSEPH A. SEINER*
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court introduced
a new plausibility pleading standard, abrogating well-established precedent. Under this
standard, a plaintiff must now allege enough facts in the complaint to state a plausible
claim to relief Twombly and Iqbal transformed civil procedure law, and both courts and
litigants have struggled with its meaning. One area that has been dramatically affected by
these recent decisions is the field of workplace discrimination.
There are two types of employment discrimination claims-intentional (or disparate
treatment) and unintentional (or disparate impact) discrimination. The academic
scholarship is replete with discussions of the problems that the plausibility standard has
created for victims alleging disparate treatment claims. Discriminatory intent is difficult to
establish, and this is particularly true when a plaintiff has not had access to discovery.
One area that has remained unexplored in the academic literature, however, is the effect
of Twombly and Iqbal on disparate impact cases. This Article seeks to fill that void in the
scholarship. This Article closely examines the two most likely approaches for applying
the plausibility standard to unintentional discrimination claims. It offers an analytical
framework for considering these claims under either standard, and explains why a more
streamlined approach to the Supreme Court's recent decisions is preferable. Twombly
and Iqbal represent a sea change for workplace plaintiffs, and this Article attempts-for
the first time-to make sense of these decisions in one of the most complex areas of
employment discrimination law.
* Joseph Seiner is an associate professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law.
The Author would like to thank those participants at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
Annual Meeting for providing helpful comments and suggestions about the Supreme Court's
plausibility standard. The Author would like to extend special thanks to Charles Sullivan, Michael
Zimmer, Benjamin Gutman, Daniel Vail, and Megan Seiner for their generous assistance with this
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INTRODUCTION
"Here the problem is... just vagueness or uncertainty."
-Justice David Souter, Oral Argument in Ashcroft v. Iqbal'
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 the
Supreme Court introduced a new plausibility pleading requirement that
would transform civil procedure law. Those decisions abrogate well-
established pleading precedent and require that all civil litigants allege
enough facts in a complaint to state a plausible claim to relief.' In
announcing this new standard, however, the Court did not clearly define
what "plausibility" actually means.'
The Court's ill-defined pleading standard has created significant
confusion in the lower courts. One area where this uncertainty appears
particularly pronounced is with intentional employment discrimination
claims.' The subjective nature of these cases, combined with the difficulty
of acquiring evidence of discriminatory intent prior to discovery, have
left both litigants and courts struggling with the correct standard to
apply.7 The academic literature has already highlighted this problem, and
much has been written on the impact of Twombly and Iqbal in the
workplace.!
i. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1o, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No. 07-oi5).
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2o07).
3. 556 U.S. 662 (2o09).
4. See id. at 678 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (requiring "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face").
5. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
6. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREs'r L. REv. 179 (2010).
7. See generally id.
8. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard
for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. IOI (2o09); Charles Sullivan, Plausibly
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1613 (2011); Suja A. Thomas, The New
Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEwis & CLARK L.
REV. 15 (20IO).
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One area that has remained completely unexplored, however, is the
impact of the Supreme Court's decisions on the other major theory of
employment discrimination-unintentional discrimination. This Article
seeks to fill that void in the academic scholarship. Disparate impact, or
unintentional discrimination, was recognized as a viable theory by the
Supreme Court several decades ago in Griggs v. Duke Power,9 and was
eventually codified as part of the Civil Rights Act of i99i.' ° A disparate
impact claim arises when an employer's facially neutral policy or practice
has a discriminatory impact on a protected group for which there is no
legitimate business justification." Courts have faced tremendous difficulty
in analyzing disparate impact claims.'" The ambiguity of the statute,
combined with the often complex factual and statistical nature of these
cases, left this area of the law unclear.'3 Even the Supreme Court, in its
recent and controversial decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,4 derhonstrated the
confusion that still exists in this area of the law.'5
When the uncertainty of Twombly and Iqbal are combined with the
ambiguity of disparate impact theory, the result is marked confusion.
Unfortunately, this confusion may be particularly harmful to victims of
employment discrimination. Both the number of motions to dismiss and
the rate at which they are granted in these cases are on the rise."
Pleading a successful case of disparate impact is now an uphill battle, and
plaintiffs are left guessing as to what facts they must allege to plausibly
state a claim for unintentional discrimination. This Article attempts to
resolve the confusion. Navigating Twombly, Iqbal, and the Civil Rights
Act of I99I, this Article closely examines the two most likely approaches
to disparate impact theory under the plausibility standard: the first-step-
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Io. See infra Part II (providing an overview of disparate impact theory).
I I. See infra Part II (providing an overview of disparate impact theory).
12. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment:
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95 (2oo6). There has been similar difficulty
properly analyzing intentional discrimination claims as well. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking
Discrimination Law, i1O MICH. L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) (noting the "doctrinal, procedural, and
theoretical confusion within employment discrimination law [that] has mired the field in endless
questions about frameworks rather than in addressing the field's core issues").
13. See infra Part II (discussing the confusion surrounding disparate impact theory). See generally
Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 775
(20o9) ("[N]one of the circuits have a uniform standard for evaluating disparate impact cases.").
14. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
15. See Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?,
90 B.U. L. REv. 2181 (2010) (discussing possible interpretations of the Ricci decision as it applies to
disparate impact cases).
16. See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES (Mar. 2011) (providing a study analyzing the impact of the Twombly and lqbal decisions on
dismissal rates in a wide range of case types).
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only approach and the whole-case approach.' 7 This Article explains why
the first approach is the better of the two interpretations.
The first-step-only approach would require a plaintiff to plead only a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.' Under this analysis
the plaintiff must identify the particular employment policy that is in
question, specify the protected class that has been disproportionately
impacted, and indicate what the adverse effect has been on this protected
group.'9 The plaintiff should further identify when the policy was
implemented and provide any statistical data that would help establish that
this policy has resulted in an adverse impact."
Just like the first-step-only analysis, the whole-case approach would
also require a plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to support a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination.' By contrast, however, a plaintiff
proceeding under the whole-case approach would be required to go
much further in the complaint by alleging facts that would support the
entire disparate impact claim. In particular, under this analysis, a plaintiff
must also provide facts challenging the employer's business rationale for
adopting the policy." Moreover, the whole-case approach would require
a plaintiff to identify any alternative policies that might exist that would
have a less discriminatory impact but still serve the employer's business
goals. 3
This Article explains why the whole-case analysis must fail in favor of
the first-step-only approach. While the whole-case analysis does provide
substantially more information to defendants and courts, this approach
applies a heightened pleading standard to plaintiffs that runs afoul of
Twombly and Iqbal.24 The approach is also counter to the Supreme Court's
fundamental message in these cases that costs must be controlled in civil
litigation; the whole-case analysis would only increase the expense of the
proceedings. 5 Finally, this approach would bring the motion to dismiss
much closer to the motion for summary judgment-an outcome that
I7. See infra Part III (discussing the impact of the plausibility standard on disparate impact
theory).
is. See infra Part III.A (discussing the first-step-only approach to the plausibility standard in
disparate impact cases).
i9. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2oo6).
20. The question of what-if any-statistical data are necessary to support a disparate impact
allegation is discussed in greater detail in this Article. See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing different
approaches to numerical analyses for unintentional discrimination claims).
21. See infra Part III.B (discussing the whole-case approach to the plausibility standard in
disparate impact cases).
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.B. As discussed in more detail in this Article, this requirement is only
necessary where the plaintiff has not asserted enough facts to adequately dispute the employer's
business rationale, or where the plaintiff wants to preserve the issue for trial.
24. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544(2007).
25. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-61.
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could result in legitimate disparate impact cases being dismissed
prematurely." By contrast, and as explained in greater detail in this
Article, the first-step-only approach is equitable to the parties, affords
sufficient notice to defendants, and limits litigation costs early in the
proceedings.27 This approach is more in line with Twombly and Iqbal, as
well as other Supreme Court precedent, and the facts required under this
analysis would adequately state a plausible claim to relief.28 Therefore,
this approach ordinarily should be used when analyzing disparate impact
cases, with certain exceptions discussed in greater detail below.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the plausibility
standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal, and explores other relevant
Supreme Court precedent. Part II of this Article examines the evolution
of the disparate impact theory of discrimination, providing an analysis of
the current state of the law.
Part III of this Article looks at the future of disparate impact under
the plausibility standard. This Part considers the two most likely
applications of this standard to disparate impact claims-the first-step-
only approach and the whole-case approach. This Part offers an
analytical framework for pleading claims under each approach, and
explains why the first-step-only analysis is the better interpretation of the
recent Supreme Court decisions. It also explores appropriate exceptions
to this approach, clarifying that in some instances a more nuanced,
context-specific analysis may be necessary. Part IV of this Article
discusses the implications for courts and litigants of adopting the first-
step-only approach for disparate impact claims. This Part explores the
unique opportunity disparate impact claims provide employment
plaintiffs after Twombly and Iqbal, as this theory of discrimination
avoids the difficult requirement of pleading discriminatory intent.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
The origins of the plausibility standard have already been well
explored, and many commentators have already provided excellent
discussions of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. 9 This Part thus offers only
a brief overview of these cases, as well as a discussion of Swierkiewiecz v.
Sorema-the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the pleading
standard for employment discrimination litigants.3"
26. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 40-42 (discussing the potential impact of the plausibility
standard).
27. See infra Part III (discussing the benefits of the first-step-only approach).
28. See infra Part III.
29. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (20io); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6o DUKE L.J. t (2oio).
30. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
February 2o131
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The current debate in this area of the law centers on the meaning of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).3 ' That rule requires that a
plaintiff's complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 32 In Conley v. Gibson,33
decided several decades ago, the Supreme Court considered the proper
pleading standard for cases brought under this rule.34 The Court, in
deciding a civil rights case brought under the Railway Labor Act,
concluded that a motion to dismiss should not be granted "unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."35 This "no set of
facts" language largely controlled the pleading of civil cases under
Rule 8(a)(2) for the next fifty years. 6
This all changed with the Supreme Court's controversial decision in
Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly.37 In Twombly, the Court considered
whether the plaintiffs' complaint in a class-action antitrust case was
sufficient to proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants -several major telephone
companies-had violated Section One of the Sherman Act by unlawfully
"conspir[ing] to restrain trade."39 The complaint specifically alleged that
this conspiracy was the result of unlawful parallel conduct and an
agreement between the companies not to engage in competition.
In considering the sufficiency of these pleadings, the Supreme Court
addressed the proper standard for evaluating a complaint.4" The Court
noted that the allegations must contain "more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." And, the complaint should include enough facts "to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level."43 Perhaps most importantly, the Court
31. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (discussing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
33. 355 U.S. 41 (i957).
34. See id. at 47-48.
35. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that the "Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits." Id. at 48.
36. See generally Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951,954-57 (2010) (discussing the Conley decision).
37. 550 U.S. 544 (20o7).
38. Id. at 548-49.
39. Id. at 548-51.
40. Id. at 55o-5 1.
41. Id. at 554-55.
42. Id. at 555.
43. Id. As the Court observed, "[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the
claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Id. at 555 n-3 (citation omitted).
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abrogated the "no set of facts language" from Conley, concluding that
the phrase had "earned its retirement" by "puzzling the profession for 50
years."" The "no set of facts" language "is best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard."45 In place
of the Conley standard, the Court introduced a plausibility requirement.46
Under this new requirement a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."'47 A plausible claim is one
that is more than possible or "conceivable," but it need not rise to the
level of "probability." 8 The Court emphasized that this plausibility
requirement does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics."49
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs in the case had not provided
sufficient facts to support their allegations and had thus failed to satisfy
the plausibility standard."
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal' the Court expanded the plausibility standard by
making clear that it would apply to all civil claims. 2 In Iqbal, the plaintiff-
a Muslim citizen of Pakistan -alleged that high-level government officials
had violated his civil rights by adopting "an unconstitutional policy that
subjected [him] to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race,
religion, or national origin."53 Iqbal had been arrested and held on
criminal charges following the events of September I I, 2001."
In considering the plaintiff's allegations, the Court made clear that
the plausibility standard would apply not only to complex antitrust claims
but to all civil cases as well.5 Thus, this standard should be considered in
"antitrust and discrimination suits alike." 6 The Court stressed the
importance of avoiding unsupported, conclusory statements in the
complaint, noting that "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation" would fail. 7 The Court further advised that it is improper
44. Id. at 562-63.
45. Id. at 563. The Court noted that the standard from Conley "has been questioned, criticized,
and explained away long enough." Id. at 562.
46. See id. at 557-60, 570.
47. Id. at 570. The Court stated, however, that "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
48. See id. at 556, 557, 570.
49. Id. at 570.
50. Id.
5i. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
52. See id. at 684.
53. Id. at 666 ("[Rlespondent filed a complaint against numerous federal officials, including John
Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.").
54. Id.
55- Id. at 684.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 678. The Court also noted that "[a]lthough for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we
must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as factual allegation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to "credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its
factual context," noting that discriminatory intent cannot be alleged
"generally. ' '58
Applying the Twombly standard to the facts of the case, the Iqbal
Court held that the plaintiff's complaint lacked sufficient factual detail
and was unsuccessful in alleging "a claim for purposeful and unlawful
discrimination."59 While the implications of Iqbal are far-reaching-and
this Article only touches on the potential impact of the decision-
perhaps the greatest import of the case is that it is now clear that the
plausibility standard announced in Twombly will apply to all civil case
law." And it is now equally clear that this standard demands factual
support for a plaintiff's claims.6
The Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to apply the
plausibility standard to an employment discrimination case. In
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema-a pre-Twombly decision-the Court provided
its clearest statement of what is necessary to adequately allege an
intentional employment discrimination claim.62 In Swierkiewicz, the
Court considered whether a plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to
proceed in a discrimination case brought pursuant to Title VII and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.6' A unanimous Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff asserting a claim of intentional discrimination is not
required to plead a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.6" In
reaching this decision, the Court noted that the prima facie case "should
not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination
cases,"'65 and further indicated that applying a "heightened pleading
standard" in this context would run counter to the provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).66
Swierkiewicz thus provided significant guidance to employment
discrimination plaintiffs, and helped clarify what must be alleged in a
58. Id. at 686.
59. Id. at 687.
60. See id. at 686.
61. See id. at 678. The Court indicated that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
62. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
63. See id. at 508. As the Twombly Court observed, "Swierkiewicz's pleadings detailed the events
leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least
some of the relevant persons involved with his termination." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 5I1-I5. Under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
establishing a prima facie case requires plaintiffs to show that they are a member of a protected class,
that they are qualified for the job, that they suffered an adverse action, and that there is other
evidence of discrimination in the case. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 51o-1t.
65. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
66. Id. The Court also provided that "[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal
discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims." Id.
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Title VII complaint.6 What remains undecided, however, is the extent to
which Twombly and Iqbal either changed or overruled Swierkiewicz. It is
also unclear what factual support is necessary to plausibly allege a claim
of workplace discrimination. These questions are discussed in greater
detail below.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER TITLE VII: A CONFUSED STANDARD
There are two primary theories of employment discrimination-
intentional (disparate treatment) and unintentional (disparate impact)
discrimination. Both theories have proven difficult to apply."' Disparate
impact has a long and complex history under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of i964.70 As this theory contains no requirement of discriminatory
intent, disparate impact has been marked with controversy since its
inception.' The origins of disparate impact law have already been well
explored in the literature, and this Article only briefly summarizes them
here for purposes of providing context.72
Disparate impact was first recognized as a viable theory of
discrimination by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power.73 In
Griggs, the Court considered whether an employer requiring a high
school education and a minimum score on two standardized tests for
placement in preferred company departments ran afoul of Title VII.74
67. See id. at 514-15.
68. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, iii (2003) ("Title VII
jurisprudence is typically divided into two main theories: disparate treatment theory... and disparate
impact theory .... To these, we might add a third theory: hostile work environment theory."); Charles
A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 911,
913-14 (2005) ("Early in its history, the Supreme Court adopted two definitions of the term
["discriminate"]. The first definition, disparate impact... required neither proof of motive nor intent
on the employer's behalf. Ironically, the second theory the Court recognized, disparate treatment, has
come to dominate the cases and commentary.").
69. See generally Sperino, supra note 12 (discussing the "theoretical confusion within employment
discrimination law").
70. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis,
63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 255 (2011) (providing "a new look at the historical origins of disparate impact
analysis"); Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White
Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505, 15 13-24 (2004) (providing an overview of disparate impact theory). See
generally Seiner, supra note 12 (describing the history and role of disparate impact law).
71. See Carle, supra note 7o , at 255; Seiner, supra note t2, at 98-104; Sullivan, supra note 70, at
1513-24.
72. See generally Seiner & Gutman, supra note 15 (discussing the history of disparate impact in
employment discrimination cases).
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See, e.g., Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 77-78 (2005) ("Although the original
version of Title VII did not say anything explicit about the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
the United States Supreme Court recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that the disparate impact
theory was implicit in this statutory provision.").
74. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
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These requirements were shown to have an adverse effect on African-
American workers at the time, though no intentional discrimination was
established in the case.75 Though the statute contained no express
provision outlawing unintentional discrimination when the case was
considered, the Court held that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices. ' ', 6 The Court made clear that where a company institutes a
facially neutral policy that has a disparate impact on a protected group,
the employer must demonstrate that its policy is job-related to avoid
liability under Title VII.77
Over time, the Court would back away from its characterization of
disparate impact in Griggs. Most notably, in Wards Cove Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Atonio,7s the Court established new parameters for considering
these cases. Pursuant to Wards Cove, plaintiffs bringing disparate impact
claims must "begin by identifying the specific employment practice that
is challenged."79 Additionally, the employer's business justification for
the practice should be given only a "reasoned review," and the policy
need not "be essential or indispensable."" Indeed, the Wards Cove Court
made clear that the employer does not even carry the burden of
persuasion in establishing its business rationale for the policy.8 '
Congress would eventually intervene, largely overturning the Wards
Cove decision .2 As part of the Civil Rights Act of i99i, which amends
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress included (for the first
time) a specific statutory basis for disparate impact claims. 3 Title VII
now provides that to proceed in a disparate impact case the plaintiff must
first show that a facially neutral policy or practice adversely affects a
protected group."4 The defendant then has the burden of production and
persuasion in establishing that the policy or practice is job-related and
75. Id. at 428-33.
76. Id. at 430.
77. Id. at 436 ("Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures;
obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms
controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.").
78. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
79. Id. at 656.
80. Id. at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8i. Id. The Court held that defendants have only a burden of production-not persuasion-of
asserting a business rationale for the policy in question. See id. at 658-61.
82. See, e.g., Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate Impact Analysis for
Federal-Sector Age Discrimination Claims, 47 Am. U. L. REV. IO71, 11 I9 (998) ("Congress statutorily
overturned Wards Cove through the CRA."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(k)(i)(A)-(C) (2oo6) ("The
demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on
June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice."').
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k).
84. Id. § 2oooe-2(k)(i).
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consistent with business necessity." Finally, the plaintiff may show that
there are alternative practices available that have less discriminatory
impact but still serve the employer's business needs." This three-part test
thus forms the foundation for analyzing all disparate impact employment
discrimination claims.
This test, for the first time, provides a solid theoretical and statutory
basis for disparate impact claims." At the same time, it has also
generated a significant amount of confusion in the courts, as the factors
that compose this test are somewhat subjective and can be applied in
varying ways." And the lines between intentional and unintentional
discrimination are not always entirely clear."' This confusion has led to
tremendous difficulty in the courts, which have struggled to find a
consistent way to apply the doctrine.' Many academics have already
identified the problems with interpreting the statutory text that underlies
disparate impact law.9' Professor Richard Primus, for example, correctly
highlights the lack of clarity in the statute, stating that its provisions:
reflect the lack of consensus among those who passed the amendments
about the rationale for and contours of the disparate impact standard.
Judicial developments since 1991 have not clarified matters: the
Supreme Court has yet to construe section 703(k). The purpose,
meaning, and operation of disparate impact doctrine thus remain a
pastiche of statutory fragments and judicial opinions that those
fragments may or may not supersede."
Thus, even after the statutory amendments, disparate impact
doctrine-just like disparate treatment law-remains difficult to interpret
85. Id.
86. Id. The statute further provides:
[T]he complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment
practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to
the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of
separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment
practice.
Id. § 2oooe-2(k)(i)(B)(i ) .
87. See Seiner, supra note 12, at 96-97 ("Congress attempted to resolve many of these questions
by enacting the Civil Rights Act of i99 i... which for the first time established a statutory basis for
disparate impact claims."); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 964 (discussing disparate impact analysis).
88. See Seiner, supra note 12, at 97 ("The blurry legal landscape of disparate impact and disparate
treatment in cases alleging discriminatory employment standards cries out for clarity.").
89. Id.
90. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARv. L.
REV. 494, 5 i8 (2003) (noting "ambiguities" of disparate impact even after amendments to the statute);
Seiner, supra note 12 (discussing the confusion over the disparate impact standard).
9
I . See generally Peresie, supra note 13 (addressing the difficulty of using statistics in disparate
impact claims); Primus, supra note 90 (discussing the difficulty with interpreting disparate impact law);
Seiner, supra note 12 (discussing the confusion over the disparate impact standard); see also Sullivan,
supra note 68, at 964 ("[Dlisparate impact theory remains a complicated and confusing doctrine.").
92. Primus, supra note 9o, at 518 (citation omitted).
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and apply.93 Correctly identifying a particular policy that is unlawful,
establishing the existence of a statistical disparity, providing a business
rationale for an employment practice, and proposing a less discriminatory
alternative are all subjective determinations open to interpretation by the
particular court.94 This subjectivity has clouded disparate impact law with
confusion and uncertainty, as both the litigants and courts attempt to
define its terms.
Despite this confusion, the statutorily created three-part test at least
provides a firm basis for alleging disparate impact claims." The burden-
shifting framework set forth in the statute must now be considered when
evaluating these cases.' This disparate impact framework established by
the statute must thus form the basis for determining whether a particular
claim is plausible under the recent Twombly and Iqbal decisions.
III. PLAUSIBILITY AND DISPARATE IMPACT
The Civil Rights Act of i99i, which amends Title VII, now gives
employment discrimination plaintiffs a statutory basis for proceeding
with claims of unintentional discrimination." What is less clear, however,
is what a plaintiff must allege in a complaint to state a plausible claim to
relief.
The plausibility standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal called
into question decades of well-established pleading precedent." Not only
did these recent Supreme Court decisions abrogate the well-developed
Conley "no set of facts" standard, but they also failed to clearly define
the new standard that was put in place." Indeed, from Twombly and
Iqbal we are left only with the knowledge that a particular claim must be
plausible-meaning something more than "possible" or "conceivable"
but less than "probable ....' This ill-defined standard has already created
93. See generally Sperino, supra note 12.
94. See generally Peresie, supra note 13 (discussing the role of statistics in disparate impact
doctrine); Primus, supra note 90 (discussing the lack of clarity in disparate impact provisions); Seiner,
supra note 12 (noting confusion in the disparate impact standard).
95. See generally Peresie, supra note 13; Primus, supra note 9o; Seiner, supra note 12.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k) (2oo6).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (0o07).
Ioo. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
ioi. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A] well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable." (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed."). See
generally Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987 (2012)
(noting the Court's lack of clarity in defining the plausibility standard).
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confusion in the lower courts, as the judiciary struggles with how to apply
this analysis.' 2
This ambiguous plausibility standard has created particular difficulty
for employment discrimination plaintiffs." Workplace claims appear to
be one of the areas most directly impacted by the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions.0 4 My prior analysis of this area of the law has demonstrated
the confusion that the lower courts have experienced in applying the
plausibility standard to employment disputes." Some of this confusion is
the result of the discriminatory-intent showing that is required in a
typical disparate treatment case. Determining whether discriminatory
intent has been adequately established is often a difficult and subjective
inquiry." 6 While no area of the law is completely safe from the lack of
clarity of the plausibility standard, employment discrimination plaintiffs
appear to be one of the groups most largely affected by the Supreme
Court's recent decisions."
The uncertainty the courts have already experienced in applying the
plausibility standard to employment claims is only exacerbated by
disparate impact analysis. As already discussed, the courts have been
confused over how to analyze unintentional discrimination cases for
years-long before the Twombly standard was ever announced.' °8 This
existing confusion, combined with the ambiguity of the new plausibility
standard, will likely leave a court bewildered when faced with a dismissal
102. See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 8, at 1035 (discussing the confusion of lower courts in applying the
plausibility standard to employment discrimination cases). See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Three
Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1371 (2010) ("The Twombly-Iqbal
regime is a novel and uncertain one, as well as one instituted by an unwise legal process.");
A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99, I6o (2008)
(discussing the "amorphous concept of 'plausibility"').
103. See generally Seiner, supra note 8 (discussing the difficulty lower courts have experienced in
applying the plausibility standard to workplace disputes).
io4. See generally CECIL ET AL., supra note 16 (providing a study analyzing the impact of
Twombly/lqbal on dismissal rates in a wide range of case types); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's
Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss (U. Hous. Law Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 1904134), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfmn?abstract-id=I904134
(discussing the federal judicial center dismissal study).
1O5. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010) (discussing the
confusion in lower courts of applying the plausibility standard to claims brought under the Americans
with Disabilities Act); Seiner, supra note 6 (discussing the confusion in lower courts over applying the
plausibility standard to claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Seiner, supra
note 8 (same).
io6. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (discussing the pleading of discriminatory intent in a civil
rights case); Seiner, supra note 6 (discussing the pleading of discriminatory intent in Title VII
employment discrimination cases).
io7. See generally CECIL ET AL., supra note r6 (setting forth a study on the impact of the plausibility
standard on dismissal rates in a wide range of district court cases); Hoffman, supra note 104 (discussing
the federal judicial center dismissal study); Seiner, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of the Twombly
and lqbal decisions on workplace litigants).




motion in a disparate impact case. As one federal court recently observed
in a case involving allegations of both intentional and unintentional
discrimination, "Twombly and Iqbal confused matters. ' ' This Article
attempts to bring some clarity to this area of the law by exploring the most
likely ways of analyzing a disparate impact claim following Iqbal.
While a court could impose various requirements on a plaintiff
depending on the facts of the particular case, there are two broad
approaches to disparate impact pleading that should be evaluated. The
first approach would require the plaintiff to allege a prima facie case of
discrimination -alleging (with factual support) the elements of the first
step of the three-part test set forth under Title VII." ° The second, broader
approach to disparate impact pleading would require the plaintiff to allege
more comprehensive facts in the complaint. These additional facts would
support the plaintiff's entire disparate impact claim under Title VII, rather
than simply the prima facie case. Such additional facts would establish any
flaws with the employer's business rationale for implementing the policy
and whether any alternative policies with less discriminatory impact were
available. This Part considers both readings of the Federal Rules and
recent Supreme Court precedent, and explains why the first approach is
the preferable one.
Initially, it should be noted that under either reading of the Federal
Rules, the plaintiff must raise disparate impact as an independent claim
in the case. The Supreme Court has made clear that where the plaintiff
does not, the claim is subject to dismissal. Thus, for example, in Raytheon
Co. v. Hernandez,"' the Court rejected the plaintiff's disparate impact
claim which the plaintiff had "failed to plead or raise.., in a timely
manner ..... And, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the Court considered an
allegedly discriminatory vesting policy under only an intentional
discrimination analysis where a disparate impact claim had not been
brought by the plaintiff."3 Similarly, plaintiffs should make certain that
they raise a disparate impact claim even before a federal complaint is filed.
If such a claim is not properly asserted in the charge of discrimination
before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, it may be
subject to dismissal."4
5o9. Sablan v. A.B. Won Pat Int'l Airport Auth., No. 10-00013, 2010 WL 5148202, at *3 (D. Guam.
Dec. 9, 2010). See Sablan v. A.B. Won Pat Int'l Airport Auth., No. io-oooi3, 2011 WL 1440091, at *6
(D. Guam. Apr. 13, 2011) ("Accordingly, the ... complaint is ... dismissed, so far as it purports to
articulate a disparate impact theory under Title VII.").
iio. See 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(k) (2006).
III. 5 40 U.S. 4 4 (2003 ).
112. Id. at 49 (discussing the holding of the lower courts). See generally Seiner, supra note 12, at
113 ("Hazen Paper and Raytheon strongly suggest, then, that a litigant must specifically set forth a
disparate impact theory or else this theory will be considered waived.").
113. 5o7 U.S. 604,6o9-1o (I993).
114. See, e.g., NAACP v. Ballard, 741 F. Supp. 2d 925, 940 (S.D. Ind. 2OO) ("A charge that alleges
disparate treatment and does not identify a neutral employment policy does not preserve a disparate
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A. FIRST-STEP-ONLY APPROACH
Under the first reading of the Federal Rules-the first-step-only
approach-the plaintiff would be required to allege only a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination. This would require the plaintiff
to assert the first step of the three-part test set forth under Title VII."5
More specifically, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that a
facially neutral policy or practice adversely affects a protected group."'
To proceed under this first approach, then, the plaintiff must allege the
following three facts:
First, the plaintiff must identify the policy that is in question. This is
perhaps the most basic-and most important-fact involved in the case.
Any plausible complaint will thus include a plain statement of the
employer's policy or practice that is purportedly resulting in an unlawful
disparate impact."7 This statement should be as straightforward and
specific as possible. Thus, for example, where a standardized test is at
issue, the plaintiff should allege the type of test used, what the test
purports to measure, and how the results of the test are being used by the
employer."8 The plaintiff should further include the timing of the
impact claim."); Santos v. Panda Express, Inc., No. C 10-01370 SBA, 2010 WL 497r761, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2010) ("[Fjederal courts in general have concluded that an administrative charge that only
alleges a discrimination claim based on disparate treatment is insufficient to exhaust a claim for
disparate impact-and vice-versa."); Leo v. Garmin Int'l, No. 09 -CV-21 3 9 -KHV, 2009 WL 3122502, at
*5 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2009) ("[P]laintiff's charge did not mention a specific policy or an adverse effect
on a protected class... [Pilaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies on his disparate impact
claim ....").
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k); see also Rogers v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 259 F. Supp. 2d 200, 208
(D. Conn. 2003) ("To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must (I) identify a
policy or practice, (2) demonstrate that a disparity exists, and (3) establish a causal relationship
between the two."); Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should Protect Speakers of
Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm 637, 682 (1998) ("The plaintiff's prima facie case in a Title VII
disparate impact case requires a showing that a facially neutral employment practice has a
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class.").
116. See, e.g., Padron v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1o46 (N.D. I11. 2011)
("Plaintiffs do not describe in their complaint a specific, facially-neutral policy that has a disparate
impact on people... who work for Defendant."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(k)(I); Ernest F.
Lidge III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1, 24
(2005) ("In a disparate impact claim, the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case by showing that a
facially neutral employment practice has a significant disparate impact on one of the groups protected
by Title VII.").
117. See, e.g., Padron, 783 F. Supp. 2d at io5o ("Plaintiffs' EEOC charges not only fail to use the
term 'disparate impact,' but they also fail to allege any specific policy, much less one that could be
construed as having a disparate impact on Defendant's ... employees."); Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 646 F. Supp. 2d 464,469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("(A plaintiff must] identify in his pleadings a specific
employment practice that is the cause of the disparate impact."); Combs v. Grand Victoria Casino &
Resort, No. i:o8-CV-oo 4 I4 -RLY-JMS, 2008 WL 445246o, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 20o8) ("In the
instant case, Plaintiffs have not pointed to a specific employment practice to support their disparate
impact claims. Their vague claims of subjective decision-making cannot be considered a specific test,
requirement, or practice." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118. It is worth noting that "although the plaintiff 'normally' has the burden of identifying the
February 2013]
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particular policy, setting forth when the policy was implemented by the
employer. By including the timing of the practice used, the plaintiff will
further help avoid any assertion that the charge of discrimination was not
filed in a timely manner.'' 9
Second, to sufficiently allege a disparate impact claim under the
first-step-only reading of the Federal Rules, the plaintiff must assert the
protected class that has been disproportionately impacted by the policy
or practice in question.'2° Thus, the plaintiff must allege whether the
discrimination occurred on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin or
religion.'"' And the plaintiff should be as specific as possible, identifying
the particular protected characteristic that has been affected.'22 Thus, for
example, a plaintiff could allege that the policy in question has adversely
affected female workers. '23
Third, the plaintiff should allege that the policy has resulted in an
adverse effect on the protected group identified in the complaint." Thus,
the impact of the facially neutral policy or practice must truly be
adverse.' 5 And, this adverse effect must further impact the protected
specific practice she claims causes the disparity she identifies, she need not do so if the employer's
process is not 'capable' of being subdivided for such purposes." Sullivan, supra note 68, at 980 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(I)(B)(i)).
ii9. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(e)(i) ("A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... except that in a case
[where] the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency.., such
charge shall be filed... within three hundred days ..."). Cf. Ndondji v. InterPark, Inc., 768 F. Supp.
2d 263, 280 (D.D.C. 2011) ("[B]ecause statute of limitations issues often depend on contested
questions of fact, dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face is conclusively time-barred."
(alteration in original)).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(i).
121. Id. § 2oooe-2(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."). Cf. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local io66, 48 F.3d 594, 6oi (Ist Cir. 1995)
("[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate a disparate impact on a group characteristic, such as race, that falls
within the protective ambit of Title VII.").
122. As noted earlier, the analysis in this Article addresses claims brought pursuant to Title VII
only, and does not consider other bases of discrimination, such as disability or age. See Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Also, a plaintiff should closely examine the law of the jurisdiction before pleading
a complaint when proceeding under a theory of intersectionality. See generally Bradley Allan Areheart,
Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199 (2oo6).
123. Cf. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) ("'I was turned down for a job
because of my race' is all a complaint has to say.").
124. See, e.g., Sablan v. A.B. Won Pat Int'l Airport Auth., No. 10-00013, 2011 WL 1440o91, at *6
(D. Guam. Apr. 13, 2011) ("Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate ... a disparate impact on a protected
group."); Worrell v. Colo. Cmty. Bank, No. Io-CV-oo67i-ZLW-BNB, 2010 WL 2943487, at *2 (D.
Colo. July 21, 2010) ("[A] plaintiff alleging disparate impact must point to both a significant disparate
impact and to a particular policy or practice that caused the disparity." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
125. See, e.g., Worrell, 20Io WL 2943487, at *2 (discussing the lack of damages in an alleged
disparate impact case).
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group identified (as well as the plaintiff)."' Though there are many ways
to allege such an adverse impact, one common way is through some type
of numerical data.'27 This type of data often takes the form of a statistical
analysis of the impact of the employer's policy.2' Not all courts require
the inclusion of these types of statistics to proceed with a disparate impact
claim.' 9 And it may be entirely possible to sufficiently show an adverse
effect without resort to such numerical data. Nonetheless, given the way in
which Twombly and Iqbal have changed the playing field for employment
discrimination litigants, plaintiffs will want to plead such data when it is
available.'30 At a minimum, a claim accompanied by numerical support
demonstrating a disparate impact in the workplace would seem to allege a
more plausible case than a claim without these data.'3'
This third component of the disparate impact claim will often prove
the most difficult for a plaintiff to allege. It may be that the data neecled
to perform an adequate statistical analysis are within the employer's
126. See, e.g., id. ("A workplace requirement which was imposed only on the plaintiff, as opposed
to a workplace policy affecting all employees, cannot form the basis of a disparate impact claim. In
other words, discriminatory impact cannot be established where you have just one isolated decision."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Sandra F. Sperino, The Sky Remains Intact: Why
Allowing Subgroup Evidence Is Consistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 227, 263 (2006) ("Because plaintiffs must establish a particular employment practice that
resulted in the disparate impact, the employees used to create the statistical disparity must be
subjected to the same employment decision.").
127. See Sablan, 2011 WL i44oo91, at *5 ("The focus in a disparate impact case is usually on
statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those
disparities." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Peresie, supra note 13, at 778 ("Because neither the
doctrine nor the statutes specify the statistical showing required to establish disparate impact, courts
make that decision within the context of particular cases.").
128. See Sperino, supra note 126, at 260 ("[A] plaintiff may proceed with a disparate impact case
only after establishing that a particular employment practice creates a disparate impact on a protected
group. The primary way of making this showing is through the use of statistical evidence.").
129. See Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's
Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 6o6 (2004) ("Disparate impact is ordinarily
proven by statistics, but there are cases in which the facts permitted proof without this step."); see also
Wright v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 712 (4 th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e quite agree that an
individual may, in appropriate circumstances establish without elaborate statistical proof a disparate
impact prima facie case .... "); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 989 ("[Niothing in the statutory language
requires that a plaintiff use a particular kind of proof to establish disparate impact."). Compare, e.g.,
Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 646 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("It would be inappropriate
to require a plaintiff to produce statistics to support her disparate impact claim before the plaintiff has
had the benefit of discovery."), with Howard v. Gutierrez, 571 F. Supp. 2d 145, 159 (D.D.C. 2oo8)
("[P]laintiffs must prove causation-that is, they must amass statistical evidence of a kind and degree
sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of members of the protected
class from obtaining promotions and promotional opportunities." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. See McCoy v. Canterbury, No. 3:10-0368, 2oio WL 5343298, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 2o, 2oio)
("Because Plaintiff fails to offer numerical or statistical evidence demonstrating disparate impact, she
must allege sufficient factual detail of a series of discrete episodes of the contested employment
practice in order to raise a plausible inference that it has a discriminatory impact on minorities, and
that Defendant is responsible for it.").
131. See Peresie, supra note 13, at 774 ("[I]n Title VII disparate impact discrimination
cases.., statistics are plaintiffs' key evidence in establishing a prima facie case.").
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possession and cannot be attained until discovery-which may be too
late if the claim is dismissed.'32 And such an analysis will typically prove
costly. Experts will often be required to properly analyze the data, and
this type of testimony can come with substantial expense.'33 Nonetheless,
plaintiffs should allege these data where at all possible to help establish a
plausible disparate impact claim. And courts should take a flexible
approach to allowing limited discovery for these claims, and in permitting
leave to amend a complaint where important data are discovered later in
court proceedings.'34
In sum, to properly plead a disparate impact claim under the first-
step-only approach, a plaintiff must allege the following three facts:
(I) The employment policy or practice in question;
(2) The protected class that has been disproportionately impacted;
and
(3) The adverse effect on the plaintiff and the protected group.
The first-step-only approach is the more straightforward of the two models
discussed in this Article. A plaintiff proceeding under this approach should
often have little difficulty surviving a motion to dismiss.
By way of example, then, let us consider a hypothetical case where a
retail shoe company refuses to hire short workers because they cannot
reach the inventory on higher stocking shelves for prospective customers.
A female plaintiff negatively affected by this policy could properly plead
a Title VII disparate impact claim under the first-step-only approach by
alleging the following:
The defendant-employer unlawfully adopted a height policy in March
2012, which requires all workers to be at least five-feet, six-inches tall.
On July 31, 2012, I was denied employment at the company as a result
of this policy, which disproportionately impacts me and other female
employees. The attached statistical data reflect that this policy restricts
the employment opportunities of women workers in direct violation of
Title VII.
As seen by this example, the first-step-only approach should not be
particularly onerous to satisfy, and a short paragraph will often suffice.
132. See, e.g., Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 646 F. Supp. 2d 464,469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the
importance of discovery to obtain statistical data).
133. See Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 8o7, 829 (20o0) ("For
individual claimants, the disparate impact course of action may prove too expensive. It is not sufficient
to argue that to prove specific practices disparately impact women compared to men, the plaintiff has
to offer statistical data supporting the claim which requires collecting data and hiring experts to
conduct regression analysis.").
134. See generally Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, io9 MIcH. L. REv. 53 (2010)
(discussing the use of discovery following Twombly and Iqbal); see also Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc.,
No. 3:09cv737, 2oio WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) ("Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contemplates.., motions to amend pleadings on that basis of relevant facts learned during
discovery, and such motions should be liberally granted, meaning that the flexibility of amendment
softens any painful blow of heightened pleading standards." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[Vol. 64:287
PLAUSIBILITY & DISPARATE IMPACT
Nonetheless, the example conveys important information about the
claim to the defendant, which will now be able to begin its investigation
of the allegations. Thus, the example above identifies the policy or
practice in question (height requirement), the protected group that has
been impacted (prospective female workers), and the adverse impact
that has resulted (failure to hire). The allegations also include numerical
data, as well as the timing of the policy and adverse action, which would
further bolster the plaintiff's claim.
The first-step-only approach is entirely consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and should satisfy the plausibility
standard. Both decisions were primarily concerned with providing fair
notice to defendants of the plaintiff's claims.'35 And, the decisions reflect
the Court's concerns over unmeritorious claims imposing unnecessary
costs on defendants or even forcing defendants to settle baseless
allegations."' The approach outlined above satisfies these concerns. It
provides enough factual support of a plaintiff's disparate impact claim to
give both the defendant and the court a sufficient understanding of the
claim and whether it should be allowed to proceed. Thus, in the example
set forth above, a defendant would have a very clear picture of the claim,
as the specific policy in question, the adverse action, and the statistical
impact on a particular protected group have all been clearly identified.
At the same time, the first-step-only analysis offers a fair approach
for plaintiffs. Most plaintiffs will typically have access to the information
required under this approach, and many litigants could therefore
adequately allege their claims without the need for discovery. As seen by
the example above, a plaintiff would clearly know the specific policy
(height requirement) which resulted in the adverse action (failure-to-
hire) that they suffered. And, though not always the case, the statistical
data used to support this particular claim would likely be available to the
plaintiff without the need for any discovery.
The first-step-only approach is also well supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema."7 Swierkiewicz is the seminal
pleading decision for employment discrimination litigants, which held that
a Title VII plaintiff "need not plead a prima facie case of
discrimination.' Thus, where a plaintiff does plead a prima facie case,
that litigant should typically survive dismissal.'39 In essence, where a
plaintiff in an employment discrimination case pleads more than what
Swierkiewicz requires, that plaintiff will have inherently alleged a plausible
135. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2o7).
136. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
137. 534 U.S. 506,515 (2002).




claim under Twombly and Iqbal. Adequately pleading a prima facie case
should thus permit the vast majority of Title VII plaintiffs to proceed
with their cases.'4° Swierkiewicz therefore creates a safe-harbor for these
Title VII plaintiffs.
4'
For disparate impact litigants, this means that to survive dismissal a
plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case-
asserting that a facially neutral employment policy or practice resulted in
a disparate impact on a protected group.'42 The first-step-only approach
outlined above thus fits perfectly with the Swierkiewicz safe harbor, as it
essentially requires the pleading of those facts necessary to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. 43  A plaintiff
proceeding under the approach outlined above will therefore have
satisfied what is required by Swierkiewicz, and will have plausibly
pleaded a claim of disparate impact discrimination under Twombly and
Iqbal.'"
One emerging issue in Supreme Court jurisprudence is whether the
Iqbal and Twombly decisions somehow overturned Swierkiewicz.'4 s
Though the courts have already taken divergent approaches to this
question, the more sensible view is that the decision remains good law.'
46
Nothing in the Supreme Court's recent decisions expressly overrules
Swierkiewicz.'47 In fact, Twombly even cites the decision with approval
while Iqbal fails to refer to the decision at all.' s While the viability of
Swierkiewicz is beyond the scope of this Article, the fate of the decision
140. There may be certain exceptions to this approach, as Swierkiewicz is fact-specific. See id. at
512.
141. See Seiner, supra note 6, at 222-23 (discussing safe harbor for employment discrimination
plaintiffs under Swierkiewicz).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k) (2006).
143. See Ernest F. Lidge III, An Employer's Exclusion of Coverage for Contraceptive Drugs Is Not
Per Se Sex Discrimination, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 533, 564-65 (2003) ("To establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the plaintiffs must identify a specific practice or policy that causes a significant
disparate impact on a protected class or group. The plaintiffs must show a causal relationship between
the challenged practices or criteria and the disparate impact." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Seiner, supra note 6, at 222-23 (explaining the contours of Swierkiewicz safe harbor).
144. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 5o6.
145. See David Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 Gso. L.J. 117, 144 (2oio) ("[S]ome courts and
commentators have questioned whether Swierkiewicz remains good law after Iqbal."); see also Miller,
supra note 29, at 31 (discussing the viability of Swierkiewicz); Seiner, supra note 6, at 193-95 (same);
Steinman, supra note 31, at 1322-23 (same); Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1621 (same); Thomas, supra
note 8, at 34-38 (same).
146. See, e.g., Noll, supra note 145, at 145 ("The better view, however, is that Iqbal left the
essential holding of Swierkiewicz- that the complaint in that case was sufficient-intact.").
147. See id. ("To begin with, the notion that Iqbal overruled Swierkiewicz ignores the maxim that
lower courts are not to infer implied overrulings of directly applicable Supreme Court precedent, even
if later decisions undercut an earlier case's reasoning.").
148. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Seiner, supra note 6 (discussing the
viability of Swierkiewicz).
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will have broad-sweeping consequences for all Title VII litigants. This
fate will ultimately be decided in the courts.49
Similarly, there may be some question as to whether Swierkiewicz
even applies to disparate impact cases. Though several courts have
already applied the Supreme Court decision in the disparate impact
context,'50 the case itself arose as a disparate treatment claim. 5 ' Thus,
Swierkiewicz specifically addressed the pleading standards for intentional
discrimination cases, and whether a plaintiff must plead a prima facie
case under the most commonly used test for analyzing these claims.'52 It
is quite possible, then, that the Supreme Court would not extend its
reasoning in Swierkiewicz to disparate impact cases, particularly where
the prima facie case for unintentional discrimination claims is codified by
statute.'53
Regardless of whether Swierkiewicz remains good law or applies in
the disparate impact context, however, the first-step-only approach is well-
supported by the reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal as discussed above. The
approach provides sufficient notice to defendants, and addresses the cost
concerns raised in the recent Court decisions. This is not to say that this
approach is not without its limitations.
Initially, it should be considered that the first-step-only approach is
primarily concerned with addressing the pleading standards of disparate
impact employment discrimination claims under Title VII. Thus, as
149. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1621 ("The ultimate interplay between Twombly/lqbal and
Swierkiewicz remains to be finally resolved in the courts, or, perhaps, in Congress.... ").
150. See, e.g., Hall v. Kone, Inc., No. 3 :Io-CV-25 34-d, 2011 WL 351o861, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. to,
2011 ) ("[Plaintiff] need not establish a prima facie case at the pleadings stage, and his allegation that
the Exam failure rate for older workers is higher than for younger workers is sufficient." (citation
omitted)); Samuels v. William Morris Agency, No. 1o Civ. 7805(DAB), 2oI WL 2946708, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2011) ("Plaintiff need not set out facts that would establish every element of a
prima facie case, but must give Defendants notice of the nature of his complaint."); McQueen v. City
of Chicago, 803 F. Supp. 2d 892, 9o6 (N.D. Ill. 201) (citing Swierkiewicz in analyzing a disparate
impact claim); Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 646 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("It is
unnecessary in this [disparate impact] case to test the dividing line that distinguishes a discrimination
claim which, although not required to set forth a prima facie case under Swierkiewicz, has alleged
sufficient facts to make it plausible under Iqbal and Twombly.").
151. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506,509 (2002).
152. See id. at 5o8. In Swierkiewicz, the Court held that a plaintiff need not allege the four
elements set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (973), to proceed in an
intentional discrimination case. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 ("For the foregoing reasons, we hold
that an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination and
that petitioner's complaint is sufficient to survive respondent's motion to dismiss.").
153. In its reasoning, the Swierkiewicz Court emphasized that the McDonnell Douglas four-part
test for establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination "is an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510. Disparate impact claims do not rely on this
McDonnell Douglas test, and analyzing these cases is much more a determination of whether the
statutory standards have been satisfied. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). This is a critical distinction
between disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, and might impact whether the Supreme
Court would extend its reasoning in Swierkiewicz to unintentional discrimination claims.
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noted earlier, this model should not be used to analyze the pleading of
other employment claims, such as those brought under the Americans
'with Disabilities Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Additionally, those courts taking a particularly rigid view of Twombly
and Iqbal may ultimately reject the first-step-only approach, requiring
more facts from a plaintiff's pleading. While this Article explains why the
approach discussed here complies with the Supreme Court's plausibility
standard, some lower courts may nonetheless choose to apply a higher
pleading standard.'54
Others may argue the complete opposite-that in light of
Swierkiewicz the first-step-only approach goes too far in requiring a
plaintiff to plead a prima facie case of discrimination. While a fair concern,
it is difficult to identify a clear "dividing line"'55 for disparate impact cases,
and the first-step-only approach helps establish a bright-line pleading rule.
Nonetheless, there may be instances where a plaintiff that has not alleged
a prima facie case has still established a plausible disparate impact claim.
The courts should thus remain flexible when evaluating these cases, and
remember that the first-step-only approach is only one way of satisfying
the Iqbal standard.
Finally, it is worth noting that the first-step-only analysis-while
providing sufficient information to defendants-does require far less
than the alternative approach set forth below.' s6 Thus, from the
standpoint of pure fact-gathering and sharing, the first-step-only
approach is much more limited. As discussed in greater detail in the next
Part of this Article, however, the first-step-only approach is still distinctly
preferable to the whole-case approach for several important reasons.
And, as discussed in greater detail below, in certain fact-specific contexts,
a more nuanced approach to the first-step-only analysis may be required.
B. WHOLE-CASE APPROACH
Under the second reading of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -
the whole-case approach-the plaintiff would have to allege more than a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. This would require
the plaintiff to assert not only the first step of the three-part test set forth
under Title VII,'57 but to provide additional details as well. These
154. As already discussed, the first-step-only approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Swierkiewicz and should be viable regardless of whether this decision remains good
law. Nonetheless, those lower courts that may perceive that Swierkiewicz has been overturned by
Twombly and Iqbal would also be more likely to question the first-step-only approach discussed in this
Article.
155. Jenkins, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
156. See infra Part III.B (discussing the whole-case approach).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k).
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additional facts would support the plaintiff's entire disparate impact
claim under Title VII, rather than simply the prima facie case."'
Thus, to proceed under the whole-case reading, a plaintiff would
need to begin by alleging all of the factors already discussed in the first-
step-only approach.'59 This would include alleging sufficient facts to
support the claim that a facially neutral employment practice has a
disparate impact on a protected group.' 60 Beyond this, however, the
whole-case reading of the rules would require greater factual detail than
the first-step-only approach in three important areas.
First, while the first-step-only approach strongly suggests that the
plaintiff provide statistical support where possible to establish an
unlawful disparate impact, the whole-case approach would require such
statistics, or an explanation of why these statistics are absent. 6' The
statistics provided by the plaintiff must plausibly show that the policy or
practice in question has resulted in a numerical disparity of substantial• "l" "  162
significance. In many cases, this would necessitate that the plaintiff
secure the services of an expert to generate the data necessary. Where a
plaintiff attempts to proceed without the use of statistical support, that
plaintiff would be required to clearly allege how the policy or practice in
question can be shown to have a disparate impact without reliance on
numerical data.'6 3 Thus, the plaintiff would have the burden of either
providing data to support a statistical impact, or of explaining why such
statistics are unnecessary for the particular claim.'6' As already noted, it
may be difficult to gather this type of statistical information early in the
case (before discovery has begun).' 6' Even under the whole-case
158. See id.
159. See supra Part III.A (setting forth facts that must be alleged under the first-step-only
approach).
16o. See supra Part l.A.
161. See supra Part nI.A (discussing the role of statistics in pleading a disparate impact claim).
162. The whole-case reading discussed here would in many ways adopt the approach used by those
courts that already require statistical support for a disparate impact claim. See, e.g., Howard v.
Gutierrez, 571 F. Supp. 2d 145, 159 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the role of statistics in disparate impact
cases).
163. See generally McCoy v. Canterbury, No. 3:10-0368, 2010 WL 5343298, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Dec.
20, 2010) ("Because Plaintiff fails to offer numerical or statistical evidence demonstrating disparate
impact, she must allege sufficient factual detail of a series of discrete episodes of the contested
employment practice in order to raise a plausible inference that it has a discriminatory impact on
minorities, and that Defendant is responsible for it.").
Y64. As noted, the whole-case-approach also allows plaintiffs to explain why statistical data may
not be necessary for a particular claim. This might occur, for example, where the disparate impact is
obvious on the face of the complaint itself. For example, a court might be willing to accept that an
English-only requirement in the workplace would have a disparate impact on the basis of national
origin without resort to a statistical inquiry. Cf Peresie, supra note 13, at 778 ("Because neither the
doctrine nor the statutes specify the statistical showing required to establish disparate impact, courts
make that decision within the context of particular cases."). See generally Shoben, supra note 129, at
6o6 (discussing how disparate impact is established).
165. See Peresie, supra note 13, at 778 (discussing the difficulty of using statistical data).
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approach, however, the courts should remain flexible in allowing limited
discovery on this issue, or in permitting plaintiffs to amend their
pleadings once discovery has commenced. I6
Second, under the whole-case approach, the plaintiff must allege
facts that call into question whether the employer's policy or practice is
job-related and consistent with business necessity. '67 Challenging the
employer's business rationale for the policy is critical to the whole-case
approach. There are numerous ways in which a plaintiff could plead facts
undermining the employer's policy. Thus, for example, the plaintiff could
allege facts showing that the employer's policy fails to accurately
measure a critical requirement of the job-effectively questioning the
practice adopted by the employer.' For instance, if an employer
implemented a strength requirement for a particular position, the
plaintiff could assert facts that would help show that the position could
be effectively performed by a worker that is not as strong as the policy
requires.
' 69
Another way of challenging the employer's business rationale for a
particular policy would be to undermine any validation studies performed
by the defendant. Employers sometimes perform validation studies to
support the assertion that a particular policy or practice is job-related and
essential to the business.'7° A validation study attempts to ascertain
whether a particular test accurately assesses what it purports to
measure.' Thus, for example, an employer might perform a validation
study to determine whether a standardized test used to decide eligibility
for promotion correctly measures the requirements necessary for success
in the new position.7 ' Such a study may help insulate employers from
liability, possibly even creating a safe harbor from a disparate impact
claim.'73 Where an employer properly uses a validation study to support a
particular selection procedure, then, the plaintiff will have a difficult-if
not impossible -path toward establishing employer liability.
166. See generally Dodson, supra note 134 (discussing the role of discovery under the plausibility
standard); see also Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2oio WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va. July
29, 2010) (discussing the importance of a flexible approach to allowing amendments to pleadings).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k) (2006). As discussed later in this Part, this requirement would run
counter to the view expressed by several courts that the defendant must plausibly plead any
affirmative defenses.
168. See id.
169. See generally Isaac B. Rosenberg, Height Discrimination in Employment, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 907 (2009) (discussing discrimination on the basis of height in the workplace).
170. See Seiner & Gutman, supra note 15, at 2209-10 (discussing validation studies).
171. See id. at 2210 (discussing the role of validation studies in analyzing "tests and other selection
procedures").
172. See generally, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (discussing the validation of a
test for promotion).
173. See Seiner & Gutman, supra note 15, at 2209-12 (discussing the possibility of validation
studies creating "a limited safe harbor" for disparate impact claims).
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Under the whole-case approach, where an employer has undergone
a validation study to support a test or procedure (which it provides to the
plaintiff), the plaintiff would be required to plead sufficient facts to show
how the study is flawed.'74 Such facts could take many forms. For instance,
a plaintiff could argue that the validation study in question failed to
comply with the guidelines established by a particular governmental
agency.'75 Thus, the plaintiff could plead facts showing that the employer's
analysis did not comport with the procedures established by the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of
Justice. ,6  Alternatively, the plaintiff could demonstrate that the
employer's validation study was flawed in some other way, and that the
particular test or procedure analyzed does not accurately measure what it
purports to.'
Once again, properly pleading that the employer's validation study
is defective would often require access to limited discovery in the case. It
is possible that an employer would have provided the study to the plaintiff
as part of the administrative process before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, or in response to inquiries from the plaintiff's
attorney." In many instances, however, a plaintiff will not have access to
this type of information prior to filing the complaint, and may be
unaware whether a validation study was even performed. Limited
discovery, or liberal amendment later in the proceedings, would thus be
necessary to allow plaintiffs access to this information.' 9 This type of
flexible approach to discovery is thus a critical component of the whole-
case reading of the Federal Rules. A plaintiff cannot fairly be expected
to challenge a study that has not been provided to her and of which she is
unaware.
Challenging an employer's validation study is only one way for a
plaintiff to establish that the policy or practice in question is not job-
related and consistent with business necessity. I8 Depending upon the
procedure used by the employer, however, there are likely many other
174. See 42 U.S.C. § zoooe-2(k) (2oo6).
175. See Seiner & Gutman, supra note 15, at 2210 ("Federal enforcement agencies, including the
Department of Justice and the EEOC, have adopted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures to explain in detail how to validate tests and other selection procedures." (citing Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 16o7 (2009))).
176. See Seiner & Gutman, supra note I5, at 2210.
177. Cf. id. at 2209-12 (discussing limited safe harbor for validation studies).
178. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REv. 363, 400 (2010) (noting the "EEOC's focus on
information gathering and conciliation").
179. See generally Dodson, supra note r34 (discussing the role of discovery under the plausibility
standard); see also Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *8 (E.D. Va. July
29, 2010) (discussing the importance of a flexible approach to allowing amendments to pleadings).
i8o. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(k) (2oo6).
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ways of showing that the policy is not essential to the business.'"' Though
it is impossible to anticipate all of the factual scenarios that could arise,
undermining an employer's business rationale -either by showing that
the procedure used is ineffective or by challenging a validation study
performed by the employer, for example-is imperative to the whole-
case approach to the Federal Rules.
Third, under the whole-case approach the plaintiff would also be
required to plead any alternative policies or practices that would have
less discriminatory impact but still serve the employer's business needs.S'
This requirement would only be necessary where the plaintiff is unable
to sufficiently challenge the employer's business rationale for its policy,
or where the plaintiff simply wants to preserve the issue for trial. Thus, to
the extent that there are viable alternatives to the employer's policy, the
plaintiff should allege those as well.'83 For example, where an employer
has adopted a particular standardized test to determine which employees
are qualified for promotion, the plaintiff could allege an alternative
standardized test that could be used more effectively while having less
discriminatory results.' 4 In this context, the plaintiff could assert facts
which would set forth the specific alternative test available, other
situations where the test has been used successfully, and expert
testimony indicating that the test would be the preferred selection device
in the case.'5 It is worth noting that the example provided here is only
one way of establishing a less discriminatory alternative. Depending
upon the nature of the case and the policy or practice used by the
employer, there are numerous ways that a plaintiff could properly allege
facts supporting an effective alternative approach.' s6
In sum, to properly plead a claim under the whole-case approach, a
plaintiff must allege a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.
As set forth under the first-step-only analysis, this would include pleading
18I. See Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1153, 1157-58 (1993) (discussing the defense of job-relatedness and consistency with business
necessity); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases,
30 GA. L. REV. 387, 395-97 (1996) (same); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity
Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1479,
1513-14 (1996) (same).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k)(i).
183. See id.
184. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971) (discussing the use of a test in a
race discrimination case). See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (20o9) (discussing the use
of a standardized test for promotion in a disparate treatment case).
185. Though the plaintiff would likely have access to much if not all of this information as part of
her own investigation, limited discovery might again be required in this context. For example, the
plaintiff might need information from the employer to establish that the alternative policy suggested
would have a less discriminatory impact than the test currently used.
186. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2044-45 (1995) (discussing alternative practices under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991); Peresie, supra note 13, at 778 (same).
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sufficient facts to show that a facially neutral policy or practice has an
adverse effect on a protected group."7 Beyond the prima facie case,
however, the plaintiff would further be required to plead facts supporting
the following three areas:
(i) Statistical data and/or other facts supporting the disparate impact;
(2) Information plausibly showing that the policy is not job-related
and/or consistent with business necessity; and
(3) To the extent that the plaintiff is relying on alternative practices
to prove its case, how the practices would serve the employer's
business goals and have less discriminatory impact.
As discussed throughout this Part, the whole-case reading relies heavily
on courts and parties adopting a flexible approach to the Federal Rules
and discovery. By nature, this approach requires plaintiffs to allege
additional facts that would - pre-Twombly and Iqbal-likely not have
been required by the courts.
Some courts disposed toward the whole-case approach may be
inclined against taking this type of flexible approach to a particular case.
Such a restrictive analysis would be inconsistent with the equity and
fairness concerns underlying the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.5 And, this
type of restrictive approach would simply be unfair to plaintiffs. Trying to
plead facts that would support a complicated statistical claim, undermine
an employer's validation study, or generate less discriminatory policy
alternatives would inherently require obtaining some information from the
employer. If a court were to require a plaintiff to provide this type of
factual information at the early stages of the litigation, then that court
must adopt a liberal approach toward permitting the plaintiff to gather
certain information. The whole-case approach and flexibility in the
proceedings are thus inseparable.
The whole-case approach to the Federal Rules is the much more
complex of the two models discussed in this Article. A plaintiff proceeding
under this approach may often face substantial difficulty overcoming a
motion to dismiss, particularly if a court refuses to apply a flexible
approach to discovery in the case. Let us consider the same example
discussed earlier of the prospective worker who had been denied
employment at a retail shoe company because she was too short to reach
the inventory on higher shelves.'" This plaintiff could properly plead a
Title VII disparate impact claim under the whole-case approach by
alleging the following:
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(k).
i88. Cf. Malone v. N.Y. Pressman's Union No. 2, No. o7 Civ. 9583(LTS)(GWG), 2011 WL
2150551, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2011) (discussing the impact of Iqbal and Twombly on disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims). See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2oo7).
189. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
19o. See supra Part III.A (summarizing the first-step-only approach).
February 2013]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The defendant-employer unlawfully adopted a height policy in March
2012, which requires all workers to be at least five-feet, six-inches tall.
On July 31, 2012, I was denied employment at the company as a result
of this policy, which disproportionately impacts me and other female
employees. The attached statistical data and expert affidavit reflect
that this policy restricts the employment opportunities of women
workers in direct violation of Title VII. The employer's policy is not
essential to the business, and studies have shown that shorter workers
at other companies in the same industry have performed their position
effectively. Where height may be necessary to the job, workers could
use small step-stools for elevation, as an alternative to this policy.
This example provides the prima facie case of discrimination set
forth in the first-step-only approach. Beyond this, it pleads the expert
testimony set forth in an affidavit to support the statistical data attached
to the complaint. It also provides information demonstrating that the
policy is not job-related and consistent with business necessity, stating
that other employers in the same industry operate effectively in the
absence of such a practice. Finally, the complaint also provides an
alternative to the employer's approach which would have a less
discriminatory impact: providing shorter workers with a step-stool so that
they can reach the necessary inventory.
Though this example is overly simplistic, it provides a clear picture
of what information would generally be required to proceed under either
the first-step-only approach or the whole-case approach. More
importantly, however, it demonstrates the distinction between the two
approaches, highlighting the additional information that would be required
under the more complex reading of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The whole-case approach is a fair reading of the Federal Rules. In some
ways, the Iqbal decision supports this approach. 9'
Most notably, Iqbal suggests that a plaintiff's pleading should reject
any plain alternative justifications for a particular claim."' Thus, in Iqbal,
the Court found the government's argument that the arrests in question
were lawful to be an "obvious alternative explanation"'93 to the plaintiff's
allegation of intentional discrimination. " Similarly, the Court
acknowledged that the Twombly plaintiffs "did not plausibly suggest an
illicit accord because it was not only compatible with, but indeed was more
likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior."'95
The whole-case approach thus complies with Iqbal by requiring an
alternative explanation to the defendant's assertion that the adopted
191. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.
192. See generally id.
193. Id. at 682 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
194 See id.
195. Id. at 68o (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). See generally Seiner, supra note 6, at 208 ("After
Iqbal and Twombly, then, most civil litigants should refute any obvious alternative explanations for
the alleged unlawful conduct set forth in the complaint.").
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policy or practice is lawful. Indeed, under this approach, a plaintiff would
specifically plead a less discriminatory alternative to the employer's
policy. Additionally, the plaintiff would also call into question any
validation study that had been performed, which would further challenge
the employer's lawful explanation for the practice.'
96
In sum, under the whole-case approach, the plaintiff's allegations
would be required to directly challenge the employer's position that it
has acted lawfully. This approach necessitates that a plaintiff provide
facts rejecting the defendants' "obvious alternative explanation"" for its
purported lawful policy-namely that it is job-related and consistent with
business necessity-and is thus consistent with the Iqbal Court's analysis.'
98
At the same time, the approach further comports with Iqbal by requiring
the plaintiff to identify a lawful alternative to the practice used by the
employer.
Perhaps the most significant benefit of the whole-case analysis is
that the defendant is provided with a considerable amount of
information early in the case. Nonetheless, in most cases, this approach
should fail in favor of the first-step-only analysis. The limitations of the
whole-case approach are simply too substantial. Most notably, this
approach requires far too much information at this early stage of the
proceedings. As already discussed, the whole-case analysis would require
the courts to permit limited discovery in many cases to allow plaintiffs a
fair opportunity to gather the required information. And, if the courts
must permit some discovery in the case prior to ruling on a dismissal
motion, it would increase the litigation costs for both parties. These
increased costs are inconsistent with one of the primary messages of
Twombly and Iqbal-that plausibility pleading will result in less
expensive litigation. 9' If a court did not permit this type of flexible
discovery, then this approach should fail as being largely inequitable to
the plaintiff: A party should not be held to an impossible standard where
it is required to provide information that it has not been given a fair
opportunity to gather.
Additionally, the whole-case approach is also directly contrary to
the Twombly Court's insistence that it was not creating a heightened
pleading standard by adopting a plausibility standard."' This approach
does exactly the opposite, requiring far more information than what was
necessary prior to Twombly. °' As noted earlier, the Supreme Court made
196. Under the whole-case approach the plaintiff would further plead facts that would weaken the
defendant's assertion that the policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
197. lqbal, 556 U.S. at 682 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
198. See id. at 680-82.
199. See generally id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
200. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 ("Here ... we do not require heightened fact pleading of
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.").
201. See, e.g., Jenkins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 646 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("It is
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clear in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema.°. (a pre-Twombly decision) that a plaintiff
is not required to allege a prima facie case of discrimination to proceed in a
Title VII matter."0 The whole-case approach requires a plaintiff to allege
far more than a prima facie case. Indeed, this approach requires a
plaintiff to provide statistical data supporting the claim, as well as facts
questioning whether the policy is job-related and consistent with business
necessity. Under this approach the plaintiff must also allege an
alternative, less discriminatory employment practice. Thus, the whole-
case approach far exceeds what is required by Swierkiewicz and the pre-
Twombly case law.
This is not to say that there is no question as to the viability of the
Swierkiewicz decision. Indeed, as already noted, there may be some
doubt as to whether that case remains good law. 4 Nonetheless,
Swierkiewicz has not been expressly overruled, and the Supreme Court
even suggested that Twombly is not inconsistent with Swierkiewicz
because the Court did not create a heightened standard with its
plausibility analysis."°' Under the current state of the law, then, the
whole-case approach would require far more than what is necessary to
allege a plausible claim of disparate impact discrimination.
Additionally, as already discussed, the whole-case approach would
likely require the parties to engage in at least some level of discovery and
would thus be inconsistent with the current state of the law for
employment discrimination claims. In many ways, courts adopting the
whole-case approach would be creating a process not unlike summary
judgment for disparate impact allegations. At the summary judgment
stage of the proceedings discovery has already often occurred and the
court assesses whether there is sufficient evidence -examined in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party-to allow the case to proceed."
Professor Suja Thomas has already criticized the Supreme Court's
plausibility standard as creating a new summary judgment."0 She correctly
maintains that there has been a "convergence of the standards" between
the motion to dismiss and summary judgment in light of Twombly and
unnecessary in this case to test the dividing line that distinguishes a discrimination claim which,
although not required to set forth a prima facie case under Swierkiewicz, has alleged sufficient facts to
make it plausible under Iqbal and Twombly."); Howard v. Gutierrez, 571 F. Supp. 2d 145, 159 (D.D.C.
2008) (noting that plaintiffs are not required to allege a prima facie case of employment discrimination
under Title VII).
202. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
203. Id. at 515.
204. See supra Part II.A (discussing whether Swierkiewicz survives Twombly and Iqbal).
205. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2oo7).
2o6. FED. R. Clv. P. 56. See generally Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but
Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889
(2oo9) (discussing discovery and summary judgment).
207. See generally Thomas, supra note 8.
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Iqbal.2 ' Adopting the whole-case approach would only be endorsing this
convergence for disparate impact claims. While there is certainly room for
debate as to whether this would be a desirable result, there is a strong
argument that this type of rigorous approach would lead to the potential
for a heightened dismissal rate in Title VII cases."° And, there is a
substantial risk that otherwise viable employment discrimination claims
might be dismissed inappropriately."'
Finally, the whole-case approach would run counter to the view
expressed by several courts that the defendant must plausibly plead any
affirmative defenses under Twombly and IqbalY' As the business necessity
defense to a disparate impact claim is an affirmative defense, this would
suggest that many courts would hold the defendant-rather than the
plaintiff-responsible for alleging any facts related to business necessity."'
These courts would thus likely find the second prong of the whole-case
approach too burdensome for plaintiffs and inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's pleading precedent. My previous scholarship has
carefully examined the question of whether defendants must plausibly
plead an affirmative defense, and concluded that they should bear this
burden under Twombly and Iqbal. I3 In my view, then, the whole-case
approach would be inconsistent with the existing pleading precedent, as
defendants -rather than plaintiffs -should be required to plead facts
related to the question of business necessity. The second prong of the
whole-case approach thus goes too far.
In sum, the whole-case approach must fail in favor of the first-step-
only approach when all of the drawbacks are fully considered. 4 The
208. Id. at 18.
209. See id. at 41.
210. See id. at 39. ("It seems likely then that under the plausibility standard, motions to dismiss
may be granted inappropriately in at least some cases where facts may be discovered that would make
the claim plausible under a summary judgment motion."). See generally Seiner, supra note 6
(discussing the role of the plausibility standard in employment discrimination cases); Suja A. Thomas,
Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1851 (2oo8) (discussing whether
the Twombly and Iqbal standard survives constitutional analysis).
211. See, e.g., Seiner, supra note IoI, at 1013 ("[A] number of lower courts have adopted this
broader reading of the plausibility standard, applying the Iqbal and Twombly reasoning to a
defendant's affirmative defenses."). Not all courts have followed this approach, however. Cf. id. at
1002 ("Many of these [lower] courts have found the complaint-only approach persuasive, limiting the
reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal to the plaintiff's complaint.").
212. See, e.g., Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Is Not Unconstitutional, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
171, 182 (2011) ("As a matter of procedure, business necessity is an affirmative defense. As a matter of
substance, however, an employer's failure to prove business necessity completes the plaintiffs' prima
facie case of discrimination."); Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact:
Should Non-Targeted Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable Under Title VII?, 8i NEB. L. REv.
1152, 1236 (2003) ("The precise scope of the affirmative defense of business necessity and job-
relatedness is unclear.").
213. See generally Seiner, supra note 10I.
214. Like the first-step-only approach, it is worth noting that the whole-case approach is also
intended to be used primarily in analyzing disparate impact claims brought pursuant to Title VII. See
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whole-case analysis applies a heightened pleading standard rejected by
Twombly and Iqbal by requiring a plaintiff to plead far more than what is
necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination." 5 The approach also runs afoul of the Supreme Court's
underlying message in these decisions that we should attempt to contain
costs in civil litigation-the whole-case analysis would only increase costs
as some discovery would often be necessary prior to consideration of a
dismissal motion. This approach would bring the motion to dismiss much
closer to the motion for summary judgment-a result that could lead to
some disparate impact cases being dismissed inappropriately."7 Finally,
the whole-case approach is inconsistent with the view of those courts that
have concluded that the defendant must plausibly plead an affirmative
defense. As the first-step-only approach offers an analysis that is equitable
to both parties, provides sufficient notice to defendants, and addresses the
cost concerns raised by the Supreme Court, it is far preferable to the
whole-case approach."' This approach should thus typically be used when
analyzing a disparate impact case.
It is also worth noting that, as explained above, the first-step-only
approach will ordinarily be the preferred analysis for disparate impact
cases. In the majority of instances, then, the plaintiff should not have to
plead facts beyond the prima facie case. However, in certain fact-specific
contexts, an analysis more nuanced than the first-step-only approach (but
less onerous than the whole-case approach) may be required. In
particular, there may be certain extreme cases where it is obvious on the
face of the allegations that the plaintiff must plead more than the prima
facie case to proceed. These cases will typically present the somewhat
rare factual scenario where the defendant's business justification would
be obvious on the face of the complaint itself.
Take, for example, the hypothetical case where a foreign-born
plaintiff alleges that she was denied a job as an English teacher because
the school to which she applied maintains a policy requiring applicants
for the position to be able to speak and read English. The plaintiff in this
scenario could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, namely that
the employer's facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on individuals
on the basis of national origin. On the face of the complaint, however, the
employer's business justification would be obvious-an effective English
teacher must have an adequate command of the English language. In this
type of case, then, where the facts as alleged by the plaintiff call to mind
supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations of the first-step-only approach to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
215. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
216. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
257. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 39-42 (discussing the potential impact of the plausibility
standard).
218. See supra Part III.A (discussing the first-step-only approach).
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a plain business rationale for the employer's policy, the plaintiff must
either dispute the obvious business justification or explain the alternative
practice that could be implemented.
These types of cases admittedly do not fit within the strict contours of
either approach discussed above, and a court presented with this factual
situation would have to apply a more nuanced analysis in determining
whether the plaintiff satisfied the plausibility standard. Such cases are
likely at the margins, however, and the vast majority of plaintiffs should
succeed in alleging a plausible disparate impact claim by establishing a
prima facie case under the first-step-only analysis. Consistent with
Twombly and Iqbal, however, the first-step-only approach must be
modified in those instances where an "obvious alternative explanation" '219
to the plaintiff's allegation of discrimination exists on the face of the
complaint.2" And, of course, as no theory can completely capture every
unusual factual scenario, there may be other unique cases that will arise
where the court will want to expand its analysis beyond the approach
advocated here.
Similarly, there are certainly other approaches to disparate impact
analysis than the two models set forth above. For example, a court would
be entirely free to adopt an intermediary approach. Such an approach
might require plaintiffs to plead a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination and provide facts rejecting the employer's business
rationale, while not mandating the articulation of a less discriminatory
practice. This type of model would fall squarely between the two
analyses discussed here. Most courts, however, would likely adopt one of
the two approaches addressed above-or a model largely patterned after
one of these analyses. These models offer the two most common readings
of Twombly and Iqbal-that the decision either keeps the Swierkiewicz
decision largely intact or that it would apply a new heightened-type
standard to employment discrimination claims.2 ' The first-step-only
approach follows the first reading while the whole-case analysis adopts
the second approach.2
Nonetheless, it is for the courts to ultimately decide what will be
required of a litigant trying to properly allege a disparate impact claim.
While there are countless alternatives to the two models set forth here,
the courts will likely either follow one of these approaches or adopt an
259. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
220. See id.
221. See generally Seiner, supra note 6 (discussing the role of the plausibility standard in
employment discrimination cases); Sullivan, supra note 8 (discussing the viability of Swierkiewicz and
the potential impact of the plausibility standard on employment cases); Thomas, supra note 8 (same).
222. It is worth emphasizing that where a court does follow the whole-case model, it should do so
pursuant to a flexible standard that allows limited discovery and permits amending the complaint. A
more rigid approach than this would be wholly inequitable to the plaintiff, which has not had a fair
opportunity to gather the required information.
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alternative that is somewhere in the middle. And, in certain circumstances,
the courts will likely want to consider a more nuanced, context-specific
approach to the case.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THE FIRST-STEP-ONLY APPROACH
This Article advocates adopting the first-step-only approach for
analyzing disparate impact claims. Following this analysis would have a
number of notable implications for employment discrimination litigants,
as well as the courts.
The first-step-only analysis offers a simplified, streamlined approach
to disparate impact law while still satisfying the Twombly and Iqbal
plausibility standard. Not as cumbersome as the whole-case approach or
other similar alternatives, this analysis would allow courts and litigants to
quickly assess unintentional employment discrimination claims. As
discussed earlier, disparate impact has been a confused area of the law
since its inception.223 And the plausibility standard only adds to this
uncertainty. The first-step-only approach helps avoid this confusion by
providing a streamlined framework for analyzing unintentional
discrimination claims. Through this framework, both courts and litigants
may quickly determine whether additional information is needed for the
case to proceed.
Plausibility is an ill-defined term open to many subjective
interpretations.24 And the Supreme Court provided little guidance as to
what this term actually means."5 The first-step-only approach defines
"plausible" for one important subset of cases-disparate impact
employment discrimination claims6 This model would help avoid the
uncertainty that currently exists in trying to determine whether a
particular unintentional discrimination claim is plausible by establishing
a straightforward framework by which to analyze these cases. This
approach successfully navigates the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and
more closely follows these cases than other possible frameworks, such as
the whole-case analysis. 7 A claim that satisfies the contours of the first-
step-only approach would also be a plausible claim under Twombly and
Iqbal. This approach would thus help remove much of the subjectivity
that currently exists when evaluating claims under the plausibility
223. See supra Part II (discussing disparate impact law).
224. See supra Part III (discussing the vagueness of the plausibility standard).
225. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court definition of "plausible").
226. There is some question as to the extent to which the plausibility standard is transsubstantive.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 29, at 90-94 (discussing whether plausibility is transsubstantive); Seiner,
supra note Ioi, at ioi5 (same). Regardless, the first-step-only approach helps define what this
standard means for a particular area of the law.
227. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2oo9); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2oo7).
228. See generally lqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
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standard. The courts should keep in mind, however, that this approach is
only one way of establishing plausibility. Other avenues of alleging a
plausible disparate impact claim certainly remain.
The first-step-only approach also offers plaintiffs a valuable
alternative to alleging intentional discrimination claims. As discussed
earlier, one of the difficulties courts often face post-Iqbal is determining
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged discriminatory intent-a
showing that is often subjective in nature."9 Establishing discriminatory
intent prior to a motion to dismiss may be particularly difficult, as plaintiffs
often do not have access to critical discovery that would help them
demonstrate an employer's animus.23° In many ways, disparate impact
claims-which do not require litigants to plead discriminatory intent-
offer an opportunity for plaintiffs to circumvent this requirement.23' It may
often be the case that an individual is the victim of a discriminatory policy
or employment practice, but it is less clear whether that policy or practice
was put in place to intentionally discriminate against the individual.2 3 In
these instances, plaintiffs may be able to avoid the dismissal of their case
by characterizing the claim as one of unintentional (rather than
intentional) discrimination.33 Where a particular court interprets the
plausibility standard as imposing an onerous burden on the plaintiff in
establishing discriminatory intent-or where the plaintiff simply cannot
access the necessary evidence prior to discovery- alleging unintentional
discrimination may thus provide a viable alternative for these victims. 34
This alternative becomes particularly attractive where a court
follows the less cumbersome first-step-only analysis for disparate impact
claims. This approach offers many plaintiffs a viable and streamlined way
to allege the existence of an unlawful policy or practice-an approach
that would be particularly useful where the plaintiff is unable to establish
discriminatory intent early in the case. This is not to say that plaintiffs
should necessarily pursue a disparate impact claim in lieu of alleging
disparate treatment. Indeed, there are many drawbacks to doing so. In
particular, disparate impact claims-which often require a detailed
229. See supra Part III (discussing discriminatory intent in employment discrimination cases).
230. See generally Seiner, supra note 6 (discussing discriminatory intent in employment
discrimination cases).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(k) (2oo6). I have previously argued that pleading discriminatory
intent in a Title VII employment discrimination case should be a relatively straightforward process.
See generally Seiner, supra note 6.
232. See generally Seiner, supra note 12 (discussing the distinction between disparate impact and
disparate treatment claims).
233. Of course, there is nothing that prohibits an employment discrimination plaintiff from
alleging both disparate impact and disparate treatment in the complaint. Plaintiffs may find it
beneficial to allege both where it is unclear how the particular court will treat the allegations.




statistical analysis-can be quite expensive to prove. '35 Further, unlike
cases involving intentional discrimination, a prevailing plaintiff in a
disparate impact case cannot recover punitive or compensatory damages.36
And, even though a plaintiff may in some instances be more likely to
survive a motion to dismiss in a disparate impact case, that claim may
ultimately fail later in the proceedings. Nonetheless, where Twombly and
Iqbal have muddied the waters for plaintiffs trying to establish
discriminatory intent, alleging disparate impact (either in addition to or
instead of a disparate treatment claim) may be a way for plaintiffs to
increase their likelihood of prevailing in the case. And, as already noted,
this is particularly true where a court follows the more streamlined first-
step-only approach to disparate impact.
This Article is not the first to suggest that plaintiffs should more
strongly consider bringing unintentional discrimination claims. 37 Professor
Elaine Shoben, for example, has called disparate impact an
"underutilized" theory.238 Similarly, Professor Charles Sullivan has noted
that "the obsession of the legal academy and the plaintiffs' bar with
disparate treatment cases, to the wholesale exclusion of the disparate
impact alternative, is largely responsible for the present crisis in the
field." '239 After Twombly and Iqbal, the potential attractiveness of utilizing
the disparate impact theory in employment discrimination cases has only
increased. The confusion created by these decisions-particularly with
regard to pleading discriminatory intent-may be avoided by plaintiffs
proceeding under the disparate impact theory. And this is particularly
true where the first-step-only approach has been adopted.
The first-step-only approach is not without its limitations. As already
discussed, this analysis does not provide the defendant with as much
information as other possible models. 4 And, the approach would be
disfavored by those courts taking a particularly rigid view of Iqbal and
Twombly. 4 ' Others might even take the opposite view-that the first-
step-only approach goes too far in requiring a plaintiff to plead a prima
facie case. Finally, the validity of this approach in many ways rests with
the issue of whether the Supreme Court's decision in Swierkiewicz
remains good law-a question that is still yet to be resolved.4 '
235. See, e.g., Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 133, at 829 (discussing the cost of statistical data in
disparate impact cases).
236. See Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L.
REV. 921,946-5o (1993) (discussing damages in employment discrimination cases).
237. See Sullivan, supra note 68, at 99I-IOOO (discussing the academic scholarship on disparate
impact theory).
238. Shoben, supra note 129, at 597-98.
239. Sullivan, supra note 68, at 912. Professor Sullivan further notes that there are "some severe"
difficulties with disparate impact theory. Id. at 913.
240. See supra Part III (discussing the limitations of the first-step-only approach).
241. See supra Part III (discussing the application of the plausibility standard by lower courts).
242. See supra Part III (discussing whether Swierkiewicz remains good law following Jqbal).
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And as discussed above, one notable limitation of this model will
occur in those rare fact-specific scenarios where the defendant's business
justification would be obvious on the face of the complaint itself. 3 In
these instances, where the employer's business rationale would be readily
apparent to the court, a more nuanced approach will be required. As
these types of cases do not fit neatly within either model set forth above,
the courts will have to look more closely at the facts alleged in these
complaints to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a plausible
claim of disparate impact discrimination. Similarly, there may be other
unique or unusual cases that will arise where the court will want to
expand its analysis beyond the approach advocated here. Fortunately,
however, these factual scenarios will likely only arise in a minority of
claims, and the more streamlined first-step-only approach should suffice
in most cases.
At the end of the day, the benefits of the first-step-only approach far
outweigh its drawbacks. This analysis offers the most simplified,
straightforward interpretation of the plausibility standard that still satisfies
the tenets of Twombly and Iqbal. The approach clearly defines what
plausibility means, helping to avoid the current uncertainty in this area of
the law. And, this analysis is far preferable to the whole-case approach,
which applies a heightened pleading standard, increases litigation costs,
and would bring the motion to dismiss standard much closer to the
summary judgment analysis.2
CONCLUSION
The plausibility test announced in Twombly and Iqbal has created
confusion in many areas of the law, and employment discrimination
plaintiffs have faced particular difficulty proceeding under this standard.
Though the problems of establishing discriminatory intent after Iqbal
have been well documented, the uncertainty of analyzing a disparate
impact case under the plausibility standard has remained largely
unexplored. By evaluating the two most likely interpretations of
Twombly and Iqbal for unintentional discrimination claims, this Article
seeks to fill that void in the scholarship. Adopting the more streamlined
of the two approaches discussed here would help assist the courts and
parties in assessing most disparate impact claims, while minimizing the
costs of litigation. This Article thus provides a foundation for considering
disparate impact cases after Iqbal and provides clarity to an ill-defined
standard.
243. See supra Part 1II.B (discussing a scenario where a more nuanced approach to first-step-only
analysis would be required).
244. See supra Part III (analyzing the first-step-only and whole-case approaches to disparate
impact claims).
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